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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

DINO JONES,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 960072-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from the trial court's judgment of
conviction entered on January 11, 1996.
is contained in Addendum A.

A copy of that Judgment

The Utah Court of Appeals has

jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW
AND PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE
ISSUE:

Did the trial judge commit reversible error in

failing to hold the required hearing to determine whether
Defendant/Appellant Dino Jones ("Appellant," "Dino" or "Jones")
was guilty and mentally ill?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

This issue involves a question of

law which is reviewed for correctness.

See State v. Larsen, 865

P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993) ("A trial court's interpretation of a
statute is a question of law" that is reviewed for correctness);
see generally State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988)
(reviewing trial court's ruling for correctness).
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE:

Defense counsel requested

that the trial court hold the required hearing to determine
whether Jones was currently mentally ill, and argued that failure
to hold the hearing violated the statute and Jones' right to
confrontation and due process.

R. 140.

TEXT OF DETERMINATIVE
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of the following determinative statutes and
constitutional provisions are contained in this brief or in
Addendum B:
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103 (1995)
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104 (1995)
Former Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-21.5
Amendment XIV, United States Constitution
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant/Appellant Dino Jones, a sixteen-year-old
juvenile at the time of the incident in this case, was certified
to stand trial as an adult.

R. 06.

In an Amended Information

dated February 15, 1995, the State charged Jones with criminal
homicide, Murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1995) .x

On November 6, 1995, Jones pled

guilty and mentally ill to the amended charge of Manslaughter, a
second degree felony.

R. 67-73, 75-76.

The court ordered Jones be remanded and transported to
the custody of the Utah State Hospital for a mental evaluation as
to whether Jones was presently mentally ill.
1

R. 76-78.

He also

The Amended Information is not numbered in the District
Court file. It can be located on the left flap of the official
District Court file.
2

ordered that Adult Probation and Parole ("AP&P") prepare a
presentence report.
December 18, 1995.

R. 78.

The trial judge set sentencing for

R. 81.

At the sentencing hearing scheduled for December 18,
1995, the trial judge continued the sentencing to January 11,
1996.

R. 83.

At the January 11, 1996 sentencing, defense

counsel requested that the required presentence hearing to
determine whether Jones was currently guilty and mentally ill be
held.

R. 120.

The trial judge denied the request and sentenced

Jones to serve one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison.
R. 88, 171.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2
A.

THE INCIDENT

Dino Jones, who was sixteen years old at the time of the
incident, was in Salt Lake City with his mother.

R. 141.

Dino,

a full-blooded Navajo, lived on the reservation near Chinle,
Arizona, but had lived in Salt Lake City in the past.

R. 141,

142.
On the night of October 1, 1994, Dino looked up his old
friend, Gordon Kee.
years of age.

R. 142.

Gordon was also under eighteen

Dino went to Gordon's house and joined a group of

four or five kids who were hanging out.
2

R. 142.

Gordon Kee and

This case did not go to trial. Both defense counsel and
the prosecutor discussed the facts surrounding the incident during
sentencing. The portion of this fact statement which refers to the
facts surrounding the incident is taken from those sentencing
arguments.
3

Jonathan Williams were two members of that group.

R. 142.

Prior to Dino's arrival, Gordon and Jonathan had gotten
several bottles of potent malt liquor.

R. 143.

The group left

Gordon's house and walked around town drinking the liquor.
R. 143.
As they walked and drank, they talked about things,
including gangs.
about gangs.

R. 143.

R. 143.

gang in Arizona.

Dino, Jonathan and Gordon all talked

Dino boasted to the group that he was in a

R. 143.3

Jonathan said that he was in a gang

in Salt Lake, and Gordon said that he had been in a gang but left
it.

R. 143.
Dino had a gun which he showed to the group.

Dino took the clip out, and everyone handled the gun.

R. 143.
R. 143.

The clip, which had only one bullet in it, was in and out of the
gun all night.

R. 148.

the gun, and talked.

The group walked around, drank, handled

R. 144.

Dino explained to the group that a

gang initiation rite in Arizona included the holding of a loaded
gun to the head of the person who wanted to be in the gang.
R. 144.

If the person did not become scared or cry when the gun

was pointed at his head, he passed the test.

R. 146.

Dino

demonstrated the initiation rite to the group by pointing the gun
at Gordon Kee's head while the group was behind Trolley Corners.
R. 14 6.

The gun did not discharge.

3

R. 146.

Defense counsel questioned during sentencing whether Dino,
living on the reservation in Chinle, Arizona, was actually involved
in a gang. R. 145. Defense counsel suggested that Dino's comment
about gang involvement was just talk. R. 145.
4

The group left Trolley Corners and went to Gordon Kee's
apartment.

R. 148.

Gordon's sister lived next door to Gordon

and asked the group to babysit.
purchased for them.

R. 148.

R. 148.

A 12-pack of beer was

When the group was in the house,

Dino gave the gun to Gordon, who hid it.

R. 14 8.

Dino, Jonathan

and Gordon further discussed gangs and decided to "jump" or
initiate each other into a gang.

R. 149.

According to Jonathan, Jonathan went into the bathroom,
and when he exited, he saw Dino and Gordon in the kitchen, with
Dino holding the gun to Gordon's head.

R. 14 9.

The gun

discharged while Dino was holding it to Gordon's head, and Gordon
slumped to the ground. R. 150.
Dino would have testified that the three of them agreed
that they would "jump" or initiate each other into a gang, and
that Dino would hold the gun to the heads of the two other boys
because Dino was the only one who had a connection with the gang
that used this rite.

R. 150.

There was nothing that suggested

that there was animosity between Dino and Gordon or that the
incident involved anything other than an initiation rite where
the gun accidentally discharged.

R. 150.

Although the State

contended that the discharge of the gun was a reckless act, it
did not claim that Dino intended to shoot the gun or hurt Gordon.
Dino indicated that he did not know that the gun was in a
position to go off.

R. 152.

The clip, containing one bullet,

had been in and out of the gun a number of times during the
evening.

R. 164.

Jonathan claimed that after the gun went off,
5

Dino looked at him and said, "What are you looking at, bitch?,"
then chased Jonathan.

R. 151, 158.

ran because he was scared.

R. 151.

Dino denies this and says he
Neither Jonathan nor Dino

tried to get medical assistance for Gordon.
B.

R. 159.

APPELLANT'S MENTAL HEALTH

The presentence report indicates that Dino reported his
mental health as "bad and confused."

R. 189.

Dino also reported

that he had tried to commit suicide "on at least two occasions."
R. 189.

Dino was referred to Chinle Mental Health after a

March 9, 1995 suicide attempt.

R. 189.

Thereafter, he was

hospitalized for 24 days at Aspen Hills Treatment Center.
R. 189-90.

Dino's symptoms "were complex and diagnosis was

difficult."

R. 190.

The psychiatrist ultimately diagnosed:

"Psychotic Disorder, NOS, Inhalant Abuse, Oppositional Defiant
Disorder, R/O Conduct Disorder and Depressive Disorder followed
by NOS."

R. 190.

The psychiatrist recommended out-patient

treatment and continued medication.

R. 190.

All of the professionals who treated and/or diagnosed
Dino, except those at the Utah State Hospital, have recognized
that he is mentally ill and requires treatment.
286-89, 328-29.

R. 190, 248,

With the exception of the two reports from the

Utah State Hospital, the remainder of the reports submitted to
the trial judge indicate a history of delusional thinking,
suicidal tendencies, depression, and diagnoses of psychoses.
Neuropsychological Associates determined that Dino suffers from
mental illness as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305(4) (1995)
6

and that his competency to proceed in this case was marginal.
R. 190.

His "IQ falls within the Borderline Intellectual

Functioning diagnostic criteria."

R. 207.

Dr. Gregory disagreed with the Utah State Hospital
diagnosis of "Malingering" and attributed that diagnosis in part
to "inappropriate use and interpretation of test data."

R. 207.

Dr. Gregory pointed out that the Hospital inappropriately
administered the MMPI-2 and MCMI-III to Dino because those tests
"are administered to adults (at least 18 years of age) who have
an eighth grade reading level."

R. 207.

with substandard reading skills.

Dino is an adolescent

R. 207-08.

Dino reported visual and auditory hallucinations while
incarcerated.

"A goat has followed Dino 'for years7 and appeared

to him while in detention."

R. 328.

this case while in detention.

He also saw the victim in

R. 329.

The doctor who treated Dino at Aspen Hills Hospital after
a suicide attempt in March 1993 assessed him as suffering from
"psychotic disorder NOS."

R. 248.

She indicated Dino did not

want to stay at the hospital if his sister were discharged.
R. 248.4

Dino "was quite guarded about [his] delusions and a

little reticent to talk."

R. 248.

He indicated, however, that

he "continue[d] to believe that Mara did control his thoughts and
that he is capable of communicating telepathically with his
sister."

R. 248.

The remainder of the Aspen Hills report,

4

Dino's sister was treated as an out-patient by the same
hospital. R. 250; see also R. 284.
7

prepared by a medical doctor when Dino was not facing criminal
charges and would have liked to be released, reflects delusional
episodes and psychotic behavior.

R. 250-75.

Shortly after Dino was arrested in this case, Dr. Mirow
evaluated Dino while he was in juvenile detention.

Her report

indicates that Dino reported hearing girls' voices since he was
thirteen or fourteen years of age.

R. 286.

Dr. Mirow recognized

that Dino has poor verbal skills in English.
recognized his need for treatment.

R. 288.

She also

R. 289.

Dino suffered from extensive mental and physical abuse as
a child.

R. 292.

He hit his head on the dashboard in an

automobile accident as an infant and was involved in at least two
other automobile accidents.

R. 291-92.

He also had a serious

problem with inhalant abuse which began at the age of seven.
R. 212.
In contrast to all of the other examiners, the Utah State
Hospital concluded that Dino is not mentally ill.
219.

R. 190, 212,

Dr. Wooten's report suggests that Dino "would do almost

anything to avoid" being tried as an adult and sent to prison and
that he was malingering.

R. 190, 217.

The report also suggests

that Dino is dangerous and belongs in prison.

R. 190.

The

Hospital also discounted Dino's fear of seeing a skinwalker and
references to being a coyote as being based on Dino's training as
a medicine man and therefore not unusual.

R. 216.

The Hospital determined that the first MMPI-2
administered to Dino was invalid because Dino told the examiner
8

he "just put down any answer because the test was hard to
understand."

R. 217.

The examiner then read the test to Dino;

the results again were "invalid."

The Hospital indicated that

invalid results are "usually associated with (1) not being able
to read items, (2) random responding, (3) being truly psychotic,
or (4) Malingering."

R. 217.

Despite Dino's language and

cognitive difficulties and his history of mental illness, the
Hospital concluded that the invalid test results were due to
"Malingering."

R. 217.

Eric Nielsen, a social worker to whom

Dino was referred by the Hospital, reached conclusions similar to
those of Dr. Wooten.

R. 220-224.

The State argued that the judge should send Dino to
prison regardless of whether he is mentally ill because he had
received maximum benefit at the Hospital.

Without holding a

hearing to determine whether Dino was mentally ill at the time of
sentencing and without ruling on that issue, the judge sentenced
Dino to serve one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison.
R. 88, 171.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103 (1995) requires that a
hearing be held to determine whether a defendant is currently
mentally ill and that the judge enter findings on that issue
prior to imposition of sentence.

The statute indicates that the

hearing and findings are a prerequisite to a determination of
whether the plea of guilty and mentally ill will be entered.

In

this case, the trial judge did not hold the required hearing or
9

make findings as to whether Dino was currently mentally ill.
Case law instructs that where the required hearing is not held
and the required findings are not made, the case must be reversed
and remanded for such procedures.
ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO FOLLOW THE
STATUTE AND VIOLATED JONES' RIGHT TO STATE AND
FEDERAL DUE PROCESS BY REFUSING TO HOLD A HEARING
TO DETERMINE WHETHER JONES WAS MENTALLY ILL AT
THE TIME OF SENTENCING.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103 (1) (1995) provides:
(1) Upon a plea of guilty and mentally ill being
tendered by a defendant to any charge, the court
shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to
determine whether the defendant is mentally ill.
(emphasis added).

See Addendum B for entire text of statute.

The focus at the hearing is on the defendant's current mental
state, not his or her mental state at the time of the crime.
State v. DePlontv, 749 P.2d 621, 625 (Utah 1987).

If the trial

judge finds that the defendant is not currently mentally ill, the
"plea remains a valid plea of guilty, and the defendant shall be
sentenced as any other offender."

Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-

103(3) (b) .
Where the trial judge finds that the defendant is
currently mentally ill, the plea of guilty and mentally ill is
accepted.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103(4).

The trial judge is

required to impose the statutory sentence of the crime and select
one of three commitment options.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-16a-

103(4), 77-16a-104 (3) . Those options are:
10

(1) commitment to the

Department of Human Services if the judge finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant's mental illness "poses an
immediate physical danger to self or others . . . or [the
defendant] lacks the ability to provide the basic necessities of
life . . . " and "the department is able to provide the defendant
with treatment, care, custody and security that is adequate and
appropriate to the defendant's conditions and needs";
(2) probation in accordance with § 77-16a-201; or (3) commitment
to the Department of Corrections if the requirements for
probation or commitment to the Department of Human Services are
not met.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104 (Supp. 1995).

The mandatory language of § 77-16a-103 requires a judge
to hold a hearing after the plea is entered and prior to
sentencing to determine whether the defendant is currently
mentally ill.

See State v. DePlonty, 749 P.2d 621, 625 (Utah

1987) ("the court must conduct a hearing to determine the
defendant's current mental state"); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d
1266, 1271 (Utah 1988) (under former Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-21.5,
the trial court was required to hold a hearing to determine the
defendant's mental state); State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 27 (Utah
1990) (pursuant to § 77-35-21.5, court held an evidentiary
hearing to determine defendant's mental state).
The requirement in Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103 that a
trial judge shall hold a hearing to determine whether the
defendant is currently mentally ill is mandatory due to the word
"shall" in the statute.

See DePlonty, 749 P.2d at 625
11

(interpreting "shall" to impose "mandatory obligation" to order
examination under § 77-16-1); Jones by and through Jones v.
Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992) (construing
the term "shall" as mandatory); State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 653
(Utah 1989) (same).

"Utah courts construing statutes containing

the term 'shall' generally have concluded that term is
mandatory."

See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist. v.

Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983); Jones, 834
P.2d at 559.
Additionally, § 77-16a-103 requires a finding by the
judge as to whether the defendant is currently mentally ill.

See

DePlonty, 749 P.2d at 626; see State v. Labrum, 293 Utah Adv.
Rep. 19 (Utah 1996) (petition for reh'g pending).

A defendant

who is not currently mentally ill is sentenced pursuant to
§ 77-16a-103 (3) (b) .

On the other hand, where the defendant is

currently mentally ill, the defendant is sentenced to one of the
three options available under § 77-16a-104(3).

While, under

either scenario, the defendant may ultimately be sentenced to
prison, the guilty and mentally ill statutory scheme, when read
as a whole, requires a finding by the judge as to whether the
defendant is currently mentally ill.

See generally Labrum, 293

Utah Adv. Rep. at 21 (holding that gang enhancement statute
requires trial judge to make written findings).
In Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1271, the Utah Supreme Court
held that the trial court erred in not holding a hearing to
determine whether the defendant was currently mentally ill, and
12

remanded the case, ordering the trial court to conduct the
required hearing.5

The trial judge in Copeland found the

defendant mentally ill, but sentenced him to the Utah State
Prison rather than the Utah State Hospital for treatment.
Because the trial judge had not held the required hearing, the
Supreme Court ordered that the case be remanded for such a
hearing.

See also DePlonty, 749 P.2d at 626 (remanded for

required hearing).

5

The guilty and mentally ill provision in effect when
Copeland was tried was found at Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-21.5 (Supp.
1988). That section stated in part:
If the defendant is found guilty and mentally ill,
the court shall impose any sentence which could be
imposed under law upon a defendant who is
convicted of the same offense. Before sentencing
the court shall conduct a hearing to determine the
defendant's present mental state.
(emphasis added).
The relevant portions of Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103 are
substantially similar. That section states in part:
(1) Upon a plea of guilty and mentally ill being
tendered by a defendant to any charge, the court
shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to
determine whether the defendant is mentally ill.

(4) If the court concludes that the defendant is
currently mentally ill, his plea shall be accepted
and he shall be sentenced in accordance with
Section 77-16a-104.
(emphasis added).
Subsection (1) and (4) of Section 77-16a-103
contemplate that the judge will hold a hearing to determine whether
the defendant is currently mentally ill and make findings on that
issue. Neither was done in this case. Hence, the Copeland holding
controls despite the change in language and location of the GAMI
statute.
13

In DePlontv. 74 9 P.2d at 62 6, the Utah Supreme Court
directed trial judges to "make complete findings of fact and
conclusions of law" at the conclusion of the hearing to determine
the defendant's current mental state " [t]o assure that the
statutory scheme is properly effectuated."

DePlonty, 749 P.2d at

6266; see also State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990)
(judge made written findings of fact and conclusions of law at
conclusion of hearing to determine defendant's current mental
state); State v. Burgess, 870 P.2d 276, 277 (Utah App. 1994)
(after hearing, judge entered findings of fact and conclusions of
law); Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
In the present case, the trial judge did not hold a
hearing to determine Dino's current mental state as mandated by
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.

Nor did the trial judge make a

finding as to whether Jones was currently mentally ill.

Pursuant

to the Supreme Court holding in Copeland, the proper remedy where
the trial court fails to hold the required hearing is remand with
an order that such hearing be held.

Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1271.

See also DePlontv, 749 P.2d at 626; Labrum, 293 Utah Adv. Rep.
at 21 (case remanded for findings where trial judge failed to
make findings required by gang enhancement statute).
After Jones entered a plea of guilty and mentally ill to
Manslaughter, the trial court scheduled a sentencing hearing,
6

DePlontv, Anderson and Copeland were decided under former
§ 77-35-21.5.
The language of that statute was substantially
similar to that of § 77-16a-103 except that § 77-35-21.5 contained
three subsections which were later found to be unconstitutional.
See State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1271-72; fn. 5 supra at 13.
14

referred Dino to Adult Probation and Parole for a presentence
report, and remanded Dino to the custody of the Utah State
Hospital for a mental evaluation.

R. 67, 75-76, 78.

On January 11, 1996, the parties appeared for sentencing.
R. 120.

In response to the trial judge's standard opening query

as to whether there was any legal reason why sentence should not
be imposed, defense counsel indicated that there was such a legal
reason in that the trial judge had not held the hearing required
under § 77-16a-103.

R. 120.

The trial judge indicated that he could send Dino to the
prison regardless of whether he determined that Dino was mentally
ill.

R. 1341.

He stated:

THE COURT: Let me ask you what you'd have
me do, [Mr. Defense Counsel], if I were even to
accept all of what you have said. The first
thing you said was that you think we ought to
have a hearing on his mental capacity. But let's
assume for a minute that I have that hearing on
his mental capacity, and conclude he's
incompetent.
There is no reason for me to decide that I
could send him - - o r maybe I should change to it
to this question: is there any reason for me to
decide I should send him to the state hospital
instead of the state prison? There are certainly
persons in the state prison that are suffering
from mental illness. And the real question that
I'm concerned with is sentencing here today.
Whether I can impose sentence on -- I suppose the
other alternative would be to simply offer that
you withdraw your plea and set the matter down
for trial.
R. 131.
The trial judge apparently had determined that he would
sentence Dino to prison regardless of what was said at a hearing.
Because the statute allows a trial judge to send a defendant who
15

is currently mentally ill to prison, the trial judge apparently
determined that a hearing and finding as to whether Dino was
currently mentally ill was not necessary.

Such an approach

violates the plain language of the statute and the basic tenets
of due process of law.

See Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1271.

Contrary to the judge's determination, Section 77-16a-103
requires that a hearing to determine whether the defendant is
currently mentally ill be held prior to sentencing.

The hearing

and findings are prerequisites under the statute to a
determination of whether the plea of guilty and mentally ill is
accepted.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103(3),(4) (1995).

As defense

counsel pointed out, the alienists came to very different
conclusions in this case as to whether Dino was currently
mentally ill.

R. 121.

The doctors at the Utah State Hospital

concluded that Dino was not currently mentally ill whereas
Dr. Gregory and every other expert concluded that he was mentally
ill.

R. 122-23.

Dr. Gregory diagnosed brain damage, major

depressive disorder, language disorders, and various deficits in
intellectual functioning.

R. 124.

Defense counsel questioned the conclusions of the doctors
from the Hospital, pointing out that they relied on tests which
required a reading and language ability which Dino does not
possess, then determined that he was malingering based on his
answers on tests he could not read or understand.

R. 125.

Defense counsel questioned the validity of the testing done by
the two doctors from the Hospital as well as the interpretation
16

of that testing.

R. 134.

Both of the evaluators who determined

Dino is not mentally ill work at the Hospital and have an
apparent conflict since they are also concerned with
administration of the Hospital.

Cross-examination of the two

evaluators would have allowed defense counsel to examine their
biases, if any, in evaluating Dino as well as the procedures
utilized and the bases for their opinions.
In addition, after Dino, whose preferred language is
Navajo, requested that the material be read to him in Navajo, one
of the doctors at the Hospital determined that Dino was
attempting to manipulate the evaluator.

R. 126.

Defense counsel

pointed out that in order to work with and test Dino, the defense
had hired a Navajo woman, Virginia Howard.

Dino was saying

things which counsel labeled as "bizarre," so the Navajo woman
was hired to aid the defense in determining whether Dino's
"bizarre" statements had cultural significance or indicated a
mental illness.

R. 126.

Ms. Howard informed the defense that

Dino was more conversant and better able to comprehend in the
Navajo language than in English.

R. 127.

Counsel pointed out

that Dino's test scores reflected brain damage and/or a language
problem which probably factored heavily into Dino's performance.
R. 128.
Defense counsel further noted that on more than one
occasion, Dino had attempted suicide.

R. 122-23.

In one of

those attempts, Dino put a rope around his neck and became
unconscious before the rope broke, and woke up in a mental
17

hospital.

R. 123.

The reports from the hospital described major

psychiatric disorders including hallucinations and a belief that
Dino had the ability to communicate telepathically with others by
broadcasting his thoughts.

R. 123.

Juvenile court evaluations

in January 1995 included diagnoses for major psychiatric
disturbance and post-traumatic stress disorder, and recommended
further evaluations for psychiatric disorders.

R. 123.

In addition, other than the two doctors at the State
Hospital, everyone who had evaluated or treated Dino "concluded
he has a major depressive disorder, at times peppered with
psychotic features."
visual hallucinations.

R. 129.

He had a history of audio and

R. 129.

Had the trial court held the required hearing, defense
counsel would have been given an opportunity to examine the two
evaluators from the Hospital and the judge may well have
determined that Dino was currently mentally ill and belonged at
the Utah State Hospital rather than the Utah State Prison.
Additionally, even if the judge determined Dino was mentally ill
but sentenced him to prison, Dino conceivably would have possible
access to different resources in the Prison than he would have
without the finding of mental illness.

R. 172.

By refusing to

hold a hearing, the trial judge violated the statutory language
and Dino's right to federal due process.

This error requires

that the judgment be reversed and the case remanded for a hearing
and findings as to whether Dino is currently mentally ill.
Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1271.
18
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CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the judgment and remand this case for the required hearing as to
whether Dino is mentally ill.

SUBMITTED this o? 7*" day of November, 1996.

(ZM^C uJcO/
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

MARK R. MOFFAT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

r.'^,rr-'*r'ftS?^*2•*•

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff,
VS.

/41L*D

uka.

L

( llhk <&Jby UezpJrJ*)
Defendant.

Case No. .
Count No.
Honorable
Clerk
Reporter _
Bailiff
Date

95/90 fa/l

m.f.1^7
<L^—v

1—

to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
D The motion of
impose sentence accordingly is • granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; • the court; JS plea of guilty;^ ftu*cfciMi/
D plea Qf no contest; of the offense of
//]
0<n<cJ((lu/tf/Xc^-J
a felony
JULC f
of the Q ^ i i l e g r e e , D a class
misdemeanor, being now preseriJUn cpurt and ready for sentence and
and the
represented hy j \ /k^/f/3L^»
State being represented by (j jt^AA^kb^^^ j s now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, JSTOW sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: ^
D to a maximum mandatory term of
years and which may be for life;
D not to exceed five years;
fef of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
D of not less than five years and which may be for life;
• not to exceed
years;
yi and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $i
% and ordered to pay restitution iri tho amount of $•
to U<\

%D
D such sentence is to run concurrently with
D such sentence is to run consecutively with
D upon motion of D State, • Defense, D Court,, Count(s)

are hereby dismissed.
*s*f\J^Hs{ 4-n Qi

LC.J//

&£-

bove ( • prison) sentence and placed omprobation in the
D Defei
Defendant is granted a stay of the a6ove
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County j&for delivery to the Utah State
*
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance
dance with this Judgment and Commitment.
Commitment shall issue
^L4AJ^AJM
DATED this
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Defense Counsel

Deputy County Attorney
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ADDENDUM B

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 16A. COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL
PERSONS
PART 1. PLEA AND VERDICT OF GUILTY AND MENTALLY ELL
Current through End of 1996 General and 2nd Special Sessions
s 77-16a-103. Plea of guilty and mentally ill
(1) Upon a plea of guilty and mentally ill being tendered by a defendant to any charge,
the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine whether the defendant is
mentally ill.
(2) The court may order the department to examine the defendant, and may receive the
testimony of any public or private expert witness offered by the defendant or the prosecutor.
The defendant may be placed in the Utah State Hospital for that examination only upon
approval by the executive director.
(3)(a) A defendant who tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill shall be examined first
by the trial judge, in compliance with the standards for taking pleas of guilty. The
defendant shall be advised that a plea of guilty and mentally ill is a plea of guilty and not a
contingent plea.
(b) If the defendant is later found not to be mentally ill, that plea remains a valid plea of
guilty, and the defendant shall be sentenced as any other offender.
(4) If the court concludes that the defendant is currently mentally ill his plea shall be
accepted and he shall be sentenced in accordance with Section 77-16a-104.
(5)(a) When the offense is a state offense, expenses of examination, observation, and
treatment for the defendant shall be paid by the department.
(b) Travel expenses shall be paid by the county where prosecution is commenced.
(c) Expenses of examination for defendants charged with violation of a municipal or
county ordinance shall be paid by the municipality or county that commenced the
prosecution.
As enacted by Chapter 171, Laws of Utah 1992.

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 16A. COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL
PERSONS
PART 1. PLEA AND VERDICT OF GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL
Current through End of 1996 General and 2nd Special Sessions
s 77-16a-104. Verdict of guilty and mentally ill-Hearing to determine present mental
state
(1) Upon a verdict of guilty and mentally ill for the offense charged, or any lesser
offense, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine the defendant's present mental state.
(2) The court may order the department to examine the defendant to determine his
mental condition, and may receive the evidence of any public or private expert witness
offered by the defendant or the prosecutor. The defendant may be placed in the Utah State
Hospital for that examination only upon approval of the executive director.
(3) If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is currently
mentally ill, it shall impose any sentence that could be imposed under law upon a defendant
who is not mentally ill and who is convicted of the same offense, and:
(a) commit him to the department, in accordance with the provisions of Section
77-16a-202, if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that:
(i) because of his mental illness the defendant poses an immediate physical danger to self
or others, including jeopardizing his own or others' safety, health, or welfare if placed in a
correctional or probation setting, or lacks the ability to provide the basic necessities of life,
such as food, clothing, and shelter, if placed on probation; and
(ii) the department is able to provide the defendant with treatment, care, custody, and
security that is adequate and appropriate to the defendant's conditions and needs. In order
to insure that the requirements of this subsection are met, the court shall notify the executive
director of the proposed placement and provide the department with an opportunity to
evaluate the defendant and make a recommendation to the court regarding placement prior to
commitment;
(b) order probation in accordance with Section 77-16a-201; or
(c) if the requirements of Subsections (a) and (b) are not met, place the defendant in the
custody of UDC.
(4) If the court finds that the defendant is not currently mentally ill, it shall sentence the
defendant as it would any other defendant.

(5) Expenses for examinations ordered under this section shall be paid in accordance
with Subsection 77-16a-103(5).
Added by Laws 1992, c. 171. Amended by Laws 1995, c. 254, s 2, eff. May 1, 1995.

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment]
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice
of electors for President and Vice-President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State,
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress,
or Elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office,
civil or military, under the United States, or under any State,
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States,
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the
same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove
such disability.
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions
and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave;
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal
and void.
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.

77-35-21.5. Rule 21.5 — Plea claiming mental illness or insanity — Expenses of
examination and treatment — Procedures — Verdict — Sentence — Commitment — Discharge — Prison sentence — Parole — Commitment to Psychiatric Security Review Board — Probation [Repealed effective July 1,
1990].
(1) Upon a plea of guilty and mentally ill being
tendered by a defendant to any charge, the court shall
hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine
the claim of mental illness of the defendant Mental
illness, for this purpose, is determined by the definition stated m Subsection 76-2-305(4) The court may
order the defendant to be evaluated at the Utah State
Hospital or any other suitable facility, and may receive the evidence of any private or public expert witness whose evidence is offered by the defendant or the
prosecutor A defendant who tenders a plea of "guilty
and mentally ill" shall be examined first by the trial
judge m compliance with the standards for taking
pleas of guilty The defendant shall be advised that a
plea of guilty and mentally ill is a plea of guilty and
not a contingent plea If the defendant is later found
not to be mentally ill, a guilty plea otherwise lawfully
made remains a valid plea of guilty The defendant
shall be sentenced as any other offender If the court
concludes that the defendant is currently mentally
ill, applying the standards set forth in this section,
the defendant's plea shall be accepted and he shall be
sentenced as a mentally ill offender Expenses of examination, observation, or treatment excluding
travel to and from any mental health facility, shall be
charged to the county When the offense is a state
offense, the state shall pay all of the expense Travel
expenses shall be charged to the county where prosecution is commenced Examination of defendants
charged with municipal or county ordinance violations shall be charged to the municipality or county
commencing the prosecution
(2) (a) If a defendant at trial asserts a defense of
"not guilty by reason of insanity," the court shall
instruct the jury that it may find the defendant
guilty, not guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity, guilty and mentally ill, guilty of a lesser offense, or guilty of a lesser offense due to mental
illness but not an illness which would warrant
full exoneration
(b) Upon a verdict of guilty and mentally ill to
the offense charged, or any lesser offense, the
court shall hold a hearing as provided in this
section, and if the court finds that the defendant
is currently mentally ill, it shall sentence the
defendant as a mentally ill offender
(3) If the defendant is found guilty and mentally
ill, the court shall impose any sentence which could
be imposed under law upon a defendant who is convicted of the same offense Before sentencing, the
court shall conduct a hearing to determine the defendant's present mental state
(4) The court shall, in its sentence, order commitment to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security
Review Board established under Section 77-38-2 and
hospitalization at the Utah State Hospital if, upon
completion of the hearing and consideration of the
record, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
(a) the defendant has a mental illness as defined by Subsection 76-2-305(4),
(b) because of his mental illness the defendant
poses an immediate physical danger to others or
self, which may include jeopardizing his own or
others safety health, or welfare if placed in a

correctional or probation setting, or lacks the
ability to provide the basic necessities of life,
such as food, clothing, and shelter, if placed on
probation,
(c) the defendant lacks the ability to engage in
a rational decision-making process regarding the
acceptance of mental treatment as demonstrated
by evidence of inability to weigh the possible
costs and benefits of treatment,
(d) there is no appropriate treatment alternative to a court order of hospitalization, and
(e) the Utah State Hospital is able to provide
the defendant with treatment, care, and custody
that is adequate and appropriate to the defendant's conditions and needs
(5) The period of commitment to the jurisdiction of
the Psychiatric Security Review Board under this section may in no circumstance be longer than the maximum sentence imposed by the court
(6) (a) When the Psychiatric Security Review
Board proposes to discharge a defendant from the
Utah State Hospital prior to the expiration of
sentence, it shall transmit to the Board of Pardons a report on the condition of the defendant,
including the clinical facts, the diagnosis, the
course of treatment, the prognosis for the remission of symptoms, the potential for recidivism
and for the danger to himself or the public, and
recommendations for future treatment The
Board of Pardons shall direct that the defendant
serve any or all of the unexpired term of the sentence at the Utah State Prison, place the defendant on parole, or commit the defendant to the
jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review
Board for conditional release m accordance with
Chapter 38
(b) If the Board of Pardons, under law or administrative rules, considers for parole any defendant who has been adjudged guilty and mentally ill, the Board of Pardons shall consult with
the Psychiatric Security Review Board An additional report on the condition of the defendant
may be filed with the Board of Pardons Pending
action of the Board of Pardons, the defendant
shall remain under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board at the Utah State
Hospital
(7) Every six months, the Psychiatric Security Review Board shall review the condition of each person
under its jurisdiction at the state hospital under this
section to determine whether custody can be transferred to the Board of Pardons
(8) If the defendant is placed on parole, treatment
shall, upon the recommendation of the Psychiatric
Security Review Board, be made a condition of parole
Failure to continue treatment or other condition of
parole except by agreement with the designated mental health services provider and the Board of Pardons
is a basis for initiating parole violation hearings The
period of parole may not be for fewer than five years
or until the expiration of the defendant's sentence,
whichever comes first and may not be reduced without consideration by the Board of Pardons of a current report on the mental health status of the offender
(9) (a) A defendant who pleads or is found guilty
and mentally ill who is placed on probation by
the sentencing court shall be placed under the
jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review
Board The Psychiatric Security Review Board
shall make treatment a condition of probation if
the defendant is shown to be treatable and facili-

ties exist for treatment of the offender in a probation status Reports as specified by the trial judge
shall be filed with the probation officer and the
sentencing court
(b) Failure to continue treatment or other condition of probation, except by agreement with the
treating agency and the Psychiatric Security Review Board, is a basis for the initiation of probation violation hearings The period of probation
may not be for fewer than five years or until the
expiration of the defendant's sentence, whichever
comes first, and may not be reduced by the sentencing court without consideration of a current
report on the mental health status of the offender
(c) Treatment or other care may be provided
by or under contract with the Division of Mental
Health, a local mental health authority, or, with
the approval of the Psychiatric Security Review
Board, any other mental health provider A report shall be filed with the probation officer and
the sentencing court every three months during
the penod of probation If a motion on a petition
to discontinue probation is made by the defendant, the probation officer shall request a report
A motion on a petition to discontinue probation
may not be heard more than once every six
months
(10) (a) With regard to persons committed by the
court to the Utah State Hospital or other facility
under this section pnor to July 1, 1989, the effective date of this act, the superintendent of the
Utah State Hospital, or his designee, shall petition the court within 60 days after that date for
review of those orders The court shall review
and modify those orders to include commitment
to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board established under Section 77-38-2
(b) With regard to persons who have been
placed on probation by the sentencing court under Subsection (9) prior to July 1, 1989, the effective date of this act, the executive director of the
Department of Corrections, or his designee, shall
petition the court within 60 days after that date
for review of those orders The court shall review
and modify those orders to include placement under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security
Review Board established under Section 77-38-2
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